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COURT"
Robert C. Casad"
Professor Stephen Ware's article is a well written and scholarly-looking
brief advocating one of the political goals espoused by the Federalist Society.
The article was originally published as a Federalist Society "white paper," and
so there is no claim of objectivity.
The Federalist Society does not like nonpartisan merit judicial selection,
and so it has a program of attacking merit selection systems all over the
country. I The society wants to abolish judicial selection systems that include
nonpartisan screening and vest control over the judicial selection process in
state legislatures. The attacks are basically the same in all the states. The
society seeks to minimize the role of lawyers in the selection process, and they
want to give the legislature veto power over any nominees chosen by the
governor. The publication of a "white paper" written by a friendly law
professor is part of the society's modus operandi. 2 The present article follows
that pattern. First, it attacks the role of the bar in connection with the judicial
nominating commissions. Then it advocates a requirement of state senate
confirmation for all appellate judges.
The article does not make a persuasive case for either point. The paper
does, however, contain some interesting information. The author and his
research assistants, aided by Chris Steadham of our law school's Wheat Law
Library, have looked at the methods of judicial selection in all of the states,
and in those states that, like Kansas, utilize a nonpartisan nominating
commission, they have looked at the composition of the nominating
commissions. All that material, however, while interesting, does not begin to
support the conclusions the author seeks to draw from it.
• Robert C. Casad is the John H. and John M. Kane Distinguished Professor of Law
Emeritus of The University of Kansas School of Law. He has written several books and many
articles on court procedures and jurisdiction. He has been a member of the Kansas Judicial
Council's Civil Code Advisory Committee for over twenty-five years.
I. See Editorial, Saving the Missouri Plan, 91 JUDICATURE, No 11, pages 160 and 211
(2008) mentioning attacks in Arizona, Colorado, Kansas and Missouri. To that list we may now
add Tennessee. See "A Report on Re-authorization of the Tennessee Plan," another "white
paper" from the Federalist Society, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20080225_
ReauthorizationoffennesseePlan.pdf.
2. See Justice at Stake Newsletter (online), Mar. 10,2008.
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The article starts out by boldly asserting that "Kansas is the only state in
the union that gives members of its bar majority control over the selection of
state supreme court justices." The author surely must mean control over the
nomination of candidates for selection. In Kansas, the selection procedure has
two separate phases. First, the nominating commission screens the
qualifications of the applicants for judicial positions and recommends three
names to the governor. The governor then selects one of the named persons to
fill the judgeship. The members of the bar have no role at all in the second
phase of the process. This confusion of the nomination phase and the ultimate
selection phase runs throughout the article.
In any event, however, that first bold statement is almost immediately
contradicted by footnote 5, which points out that lawyers comprise a majority
of the nominating commissions in Alaska, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska,
South Dakota and Wyoming as well. It is true that in those other states one of
the lawyer members is ex officio, such as the chief justice of the state supreme
court, but they are full voting members, so it is hard to see how the situation in
those states is any different from that of Kansas. There are organizations of
lawyers, like the Kansas Bar Association, but that is not the "bar" as used in
connection with our judicial nominating commission. The "bar" is all lawyers
licensed to practice in the state of Kansas, including the chief justice and all
other state officials that are licensed to practice. On March 13,2008 the "bar"
had 8,900 members. The group includes lawyers in private practice, plaintiffs'
lawyers, defendants' lawyers, tax lawyers, corporate counsel, probate lawyers,
bankers, real estate brokers, civil servants, homemakers and others. It is a
population with very diverse interests. The only thing they share in common is
the fact that each one is licensed to practice law, of whatever nature, in Kansas.
Most of them also share a common interest in seeing to it that our courts are
staffed by competent unbiased judges. The "bar" is not an organization.
Even if Kansas were the only state where lawyers comprise a majority of
one on the nominating commission, it does not follow that the "bar"(if there
were such an entity) would "control" the nominating process. If the lawyer
members and the non-lawyer members of the commission voted in blocs, then
perhaps it could be said that lawyers would be in a position to control the
process. There is no evidence whatsoever that the commissioners do behave
that way, however. In fact, the material contained in Appendix A shows quite
clearly that the commissioners do not vote in blocs. Lawyer members have no
more clout than non-lawyer members. There is no support at all for the
contention that lawyers control the nominating process.
But even if lawyers did control the nominating process, what of it? The
author apparently thinks that would be bad, but why? He asserts that "lawyers
comprise an interest group, just like other interest groups." Then he starts
talking about bar associations and their efforts to lobby on behalf of their
members. This, again, tends to obscure the point. The "bar" in our nominating
commission is not the bar association, nor any organization at all. It is a
diverse group of persons who have in common an interest in competent and
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unbiased judges. So why would it be bad if such a group controlled the
nominating system? If there were some evidence that our nominating
commissions were not producing well qualified, unbiased judges, then there
might be some grounds for complaining about the system. There is, however,
no such evidence. The article never claims that our system has not worked
well. The author seems to think that the system he proposes would be better,
but he offers no reason why it would be better, unless you accept on faith, as
he apparently does, that letting lawyers be a majority of one on the nominating
commission is bad.
One section of the article asks the question, "Is the Bar an Interest Group
or Faction?" This is important to the argument against lawyers on the
nominating commission. To answer that question, the author offers no
evidence except the opinions of some others who would answer, "Yes." He
says,
Scholars who have studied judicial nominating commissions
around the United States conclude that the commissions are
very political but that their politics-rather than being the
politics of the citizens as a whole-are a somewhat
subterranean politics of bench and bar involving little public
control.3
He should have said, "Some scholars, etc." Certainly not all have reached
that conclusion. But in any event, what in the world does that statement mean?
I have been a member of the Kansas bar for over fifty years, and I have never
encountered any underground "politics ofbench and bar."
With no further explanation, the author follows that statement with
another long quote from the same source: "The conclusion is inescapable:
'merit' selection has very little or no merit, if by merit we mean that
nonpolitical (that is professional) considerations dominate the selection
process.'>'!
The author cites to a book by Stumpf and Paul5, but there is no evidence
to support their "inescapable conclusion." Stumpfs and Paul's opinions are no
better than Professor Ware's. The intemperate tenor of the language Stumpf
and Paul use suggests that their opinions are too biased to be worth anything.6
Actually, the data included in Appendix A seems to show pretty clearly
that in Kansas our nominating commissions are in fact dominated by
3. Stephen Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 386,
at 396 (2008).
4. Id.
5. HARRY P. STUMPf & KEVIN C. PAUL, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 142 (2d ed.
1998).
6. For instance: 'The legal profession desires a larger voice in judicial selection for the
same reason that other interest groups do-to advance their cause through judicial policymaking.
"Merit" selection gives them that added leverage. All the better if they can sell their old line of
increased political influence over the courts by using the attractive, but phony, label of "neutral
professionalism." Id. at 147.
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"nonpolitical (that is professional) considerations." In 1988, a nominating
commission that included 4 Republicans and 5 Democrats nominated 3
Republicans. In 1993, a commission comprised of 8 Republicans and 3
Democrats, nominated 3 Democrats. In 1995, a commission of 7 Democrats
and 2 Republicans nominated 2 Republicans and one Democrat. Other
examples could be cited, but this is surely sufficient to refute, at least for
Kansas, the material quoted from Stumpf and Paul and others.
The conclusion is "inescapable": there is simply nothing here to support
the contention that the "bar" controls the nomination process and engages in
subterranean skullduggery.
The author then turns to a discussion of alternatives to nonpartisan
nominating commissions. Here, not surprisingly, he comes up with the
Federalist Society's recommendation of state senate confirmation of all
appellate judges. The arguments for that recommendation are no better than
those offered to show "bar" control.
The main argument for a senate-confirmation requirement seems to be a
belief that that is a good idea because that is the process the framers of the
United States constitution chose for the selection of federal judges. The author
asks, "So the question is, when taking the long view, did the Framers of the
United States constitution get it right?"7 Most of us would agree that they got
it right for the kind of tripartite, separated powers federal government the
Framers set up. They had to give Congress a role in the process of selecting
the judges who would wield the federal judicial power. But part and parcel of
that process was the constitutional grant of life tenure and irreducible salary to
all Article Three federal judges8. The Framers provided a politically partisan
system for selection of federal judges, but once the political hurdle of Senate
confirmation has been overcome, the judges are independent of partisan
politics. Judicial independence provided by life tenure and irreducible salary is
an essential feature of the Framers' plan. A Senate-confirmation requirement
makes sense if the judges are to become, as the federal judges are, free of any
further "accountability" (to use the Federalist Society's buzzword). It does not
follow, however, that state senate confirmation would make sense in a state
setting where judges do not have independence protections of life tenure and
irreducible salary.
In Kansas, our judges have fixed terms of office. The judges of the
supreme court and courts of appeals must face retention elections periodically.
Their "accountability" is thus publicly tested directly before the people. Since
we cannot provide the kind of independence protections that federal judges
enjoy, we have to take steps to provide some measure of independence from
partisan politics at the nomination level. That is why we have the nonpartisan
merit nomination procedure. Under our system, the lawyer members of the
commission are elected without disclosure of their political affiliations. The
7. Ware, supra note 3, at 395-96.
8. u.s. CONST. art III, § I.
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non-lawyer members, although they are appointed by governors, serve
staggered terms so that it rarely happens that all are appointed by the same
governor. Although the governor, a partisan political official, makes the
ultimate selection, some degree of independence of the judges from partisan
political pressure is provided by the non-partisan nomination process. The
governor can only choose a candidate that has been nominated by a
nonpartisan process. If a politically partisan legislative confirmation
requirement were imposed, it would eliminate the limited judicial
independence protection that the nonpartisan nomination process provides.
It is interesting to note that when Congress created a local court system
for the District of Columbia, they did not provide for Senate confirmation of
the judges. The judges of the local D.C. courts are not Article III judges, and
so they do not have life tenure. Congress recognized that it would make no
sense to require Senate confinnation of judges who serve limited tenns.
Instead, they adopted a system much like our Kansas plan. Vacancies on the
DoC. courts are filled by judges chosen by the President from a list of three
submitted by a nominating commission of seven members, four of whom are
lawyers.9
Our system works very well indeed. The material in Appendix A shows
quite clearly that our judicial nominating commissions operate largely free
from partisan political concerns. The fact that none of our appellate judges has
ever lost a retention-election is strong evidence that our selection system has
produced the kind of competent, unbiased judges the people of Kansas want
and need. The article makes no case at all for changing our system.
90 DoC. CODE, § 1-204034 (2008).
